Looking Backward, Looking Forward by Engel, David M.
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Contributions to Books Faculty Scholarship 
1-11-2018 
Looking Backward, Looking Forward 
David M. Engel 
University at Buffalo School of Law, dmengel@buffalo.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/book_sections 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David M. Engel, Looking Backward, Looking Forward in Insiders, Outsiders, Injuries, and Law: Revisiting 
The Oven Bird’s Song 279 (Mary Nell Trautner, ed., Cambridge University Press 2018) 
This material has been published in Insiders, Outsiders, Injuries, and Law: Revisiting The Oven Bird’s Song, edited by 
Mary Nell Trautner. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or 
use in derivative works. © Cambridge University Press 2018. 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Contributions to Books by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Looking Backward, Looking Forward 
Past and Future Lives of "The Oven Bird's Song" 
DAVID M. ENGEL 
ORIGINS AND INFLUENCES 
Out walking in the frozen swkmp one gray day, 
I paused and said, "I will turn back from here. 
No, I will go on farther - and we shall see." 
Robert Frost, "The Wood Pile" 
Looking back at an article written some years ago by a younger version of 
oneself, it becomes possible to see more clearly the influences that shaped 
both the text and the author. As we conduct our scholarly work, we tend to 
imagine that we are freely choosing the ideas we pursue and the methods we 
employ. We are the agents of our own destiny- or so we tell ourselves as we 
move forward in time. But, viewed retrospectively, there is ample evidence to 
support a much more contingent, even deterministic, view. The author as 
auteur seems less plausible. The text is also - perhaps more significantly -
written by its intellectual environment, by contemporaneous minds and 
scholarly works, by the events of the day, and by the quirks and happenstance 
of life. That is how it now appears when I reflect on the origins and influences 
of "The OvenBird's Song"' more than thirty years later. 
In the late 1970s, I found myself driving through the streets of what I called 
"Sander County," a small, predominantly agricultural community in Illinois. 
My profound thanks to Mary Nell Trautner for her tireless work in editing this collection of essays. 
Thanks for their comments on this chapter go as well to Fred Konefsky and Lynn Mather. Indeed, 
the concept for the conference itself was Fred's, one of the countless acts of generosity and 
friendship for which he is so well known and appreciated by his colleagues. Thanks to Samantha 
Barbas and Anya Bernstein for working with Mary Nell, Fred, and Lynn to make the event 
unforgettable. And my profound thanks to all the contributors to this volume for their thoughtful 
and provocative observations. 
' David M. Engel, "The oven bird's S\)ng: insiders, outsiders, and personal injuries in an 
American community," Law 6 Society Review, 18(4) (1984), 551-82. 
2 79 
Afterword 
I had begun to understand that Sander County was undergoing major social 
and economic changes, largely as the result of a new factory that had opened the 
county to global flows of people, capital, and economic influence. In the c~urse 
of my fieldwork, I identified former litigants who had been involved in different 
types of civil cases. I knocked on their doors and tried to learn from them how 
they had traveled the path to litigation in the local court and what the results 
had been. Later, I also identified and interviewed dozens of "community 
observers" -ministers, youth leaders, beauticians, farmers, teachers, funeral 
parlor operators, social workers, town council members, insurance adjusters, 
lawyers, judges, and many others. I asked them about their perspectives on the 
transformations underway in their community, and I solicited examples of 
trouble cases that had not necessarily entered the legal system. At the same 
time, I spent what seemed like endless days sitting quietly in the back room of 
the Sander County courthouse, where I read hundreds of old case files, 
extracted from them their stories of local conflict, and constructed a quantita-
tive portrait of the flow of litigation over an extended period of time. 
How did all of this happen, and why? What sequence of events led me to 
attempt this kind of fieldwork in a small, out-of-the-way American commu-
nity? I was not alone. I would soon discover that other colleagues who were 
then unknown to me - people such as Barbara Yngvesson; Carol 
Greenhouse,3 Frank Munger,4 and Sally Merry5 - were doing similar research 
in other parts of the country. Our community-based legal ethnographies were 
a product of their time - researchers attempt them less often nowadays. In 
retrospect, it seems quite clear that scholarship of this kind is not merely the 
result of our conscious choices and decisions. It grows out of the soil in which 
it's rooted. It pokes its head above the ground and responds to the intellectual 
climate that surrounds it. It turns toward the light that happens to shine at a 
particular time and place. 
This opportunity to look back at the writing of"The OvenBird's Song" has 
helped me to situate it at the confluence of four particularly important influ-
ences. First, the field of law and society was emerging as a discipline in its 
own right, with an institutional structure and a "canon" that made the study of 
• Barbara Yngvesson, "Making law at the doorway: the clerk, the court, and the construction of 
community in a New England town," Law 6 Society Review, 22(3) (1988), 409-4-B· 
3 Carol J. Greenhouse, Praying for Justice: Faith, Order, and Community in an American Town 
(Cornell University Press, 1986). 
4 Frank W. Munger, "Social change and tort litigation: industrialization, accidents, and trial 
courts in Southern West Virginia, 1872 to 1940," Buffalo Law Review, 36(1) (1988), 75-118. 
5 Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-
Class Americans (University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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disputes and dispute-processing a central concern. Second, the times being 
what they were in the 196os and 1970s, many American law and society 
scholars had acquired experience in other countries and cultures. They were 
subsequently drawn to studies of their own society that would apply the same 
methods and cultural interpretive frameworks that they had developed in non-
Western settings. Third, law and society research had begun to reflect broader 
intellectual trends that challenged exclusively positivist interpretations of 
social behavior and encouraged interpretivist and social constructionist 
perspectives. Fourth, when it comes to scholarly work, the personal is the 
professional. We as scholars like to pretend that our ideas, our interests, and 
our methods are somehow divorced from events in our private lives - the 
places we have been, the people we have befriended, our likes, our dislikes; 
our personal styles, and our values. But the writing of"The OvenBird's Song," 
like the production of much scholarship, reflects the intersection of the 
author's autobiography with the ideas and intellectual influences of the day. 
As I try now to explain the origins of this article, I find myself attempting to 
weave these four influences together into a plausible account. No doubt, the 
narrative I offer here is itself a product of the same four influences even as 
I write it down. Our explanations and self-justifications become part of an 
endless regression, frames within frames. But this is the best I can do at this 
time and at this stage in my own life, offering a version of events that occurred 
many years ago, seen now through the eyes of a person closer to the end than 
the beginning of his scholarly career. 
In college and, briefly, in graduate school, I had been an American Studies 
student. In that sense, it is completely unsurprising that I would later join the 
small cohort of law and society scholars in the 1970s who decided to explore 
law and conflict in American communities. But in another sense, it was highly 
improbable that events in my life should have taken me in this direction. 
Circumstances had actually led me to drop out of my graduate program in 
American Studies at Yale at the height of the Vietnam war, travel to Thailand 
in the Peace Corps, and then, after coming back and finishing law school, 
return a second time to Thailand to conduct research on a court and commu-
nity there. In other words, my first scholarly undertakings had everything to do 
with Asia and very little to do with American Studies or, for that matter, with 
America. After writing two monographs on Thai law, culture, and history, 
however, a somewhat random chain of events led to my first job at the 
American Bar Foundation (ABF), where it was assumed that I would focus 
primarily on US topics. I felt fortunate indeed to be employed by an institution 
that expected nothing more of me than fulltime research and writing - and 
which provided substantial resources to carry out my work. I had ample time 
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to design my Sander County study, obtain additional funding from the 
National Science Foundation, and then launch a multi-year ethnographic 
study of an American court and community. But what now seems obvious in 
retrospect is that the Sander County study was heavily influenced by my work 
in Thailand. I was both surprised and delighted to discover that, in their 
aversion to litigiousness and in their nostalgic evocation of a conflict-free 
community, the residents of Sander County talked and behaved in so many 
respects like the residents of Chiangmai. It is only a slight exaggeration to say 
that, in my mind, the farmers of Sander County were Thai villagers in overalls. 
As I have said, I was not alone in this circuitous journey. World and 
national events had led other law and society scholars of my generation to 
spend time abroad and then return home. We came back to see our own 
society through new eyes. The familiar really had become strange to many of 
us, and we were eager to rediscover American law and culture, drawing on our 
experiences in Sweden (Barbara Yngvesson), India (Marc Galanter and 
Robert Kidder), Chile (Stewart Macaulay), Kenya (Richard Abel), Brazil 
(David Trubek), Israel (Richard Schwartz), Lebanon (Laura Nader), Tanzania 
(Sally Falk Moore), and elsewhere. It is unlikely that such large numbers of 
sociolegal scholars working on American topics had undergone a prior immer-
sion in a non-US culture in previous eras. Our outlook on American law and 
society reflected the shared experience of an entire generation. 
But it is also worth asking why so many of us were drawn to "law and 
society" as the lens for viewing our culture. What was the unique attraction of 
this emerging interdisciplinary field as opposed to the more traditional discip-
lines of sociology, anthropology, political science, or law? In the 1970s, the 
US-based Law & Society Association (LSA) was taking shape. LSA had been 
incorporated in 1964, and the first issue of the Law 6 Society Review (LSR) 
had been published in 1966 under the editorship of Richard D. (Red) 
Schwartz. But the first standalone meeting of LSA, not held in conjunction 
.with the annual meeting of another disciplinary organization, occurred a 
decade later - in Buffalo in 1975 - and regular annual meetings of the LSA 
did not commence until 1978. Thus, LSA attained its formal organizational 
identity at the very time that my research in Sander County was underway. 
LSA's influence on my work cannot be overstated, and I am quite sure that 
other colleagues conducting fieldwork on law in American communities 
would say the same thing about their own research. 
Sociolegal scholarship had, of course, been around long before the 1970s, 
and sociolegal centers and associations had arisen elsewhere in the world -the 
Japanese Association of the Sociology of Law, for example, was founded 
in 1947. But for US-based scholars in the 1970s, LSA had a unique attraction. 
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It was not only interdisciplinary - fostering highly productive conversations 
among researchers from many different scholarly backgrounds - but also 
comparative. The founding figures included North Americans with extensive 
experience abroad and also a group of non-North Americans whose work was 
highly influential in the development ofLSA- scholars such as Upendra Baxi, 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Neelan Tiruchelvam, and others. 
The most prominent sociolegal research paradigm in the 1970s was "dispute 
processing." LSA scholars of that era, regardless of their home disciplines, 
shared the assumption that disputes were a universal unit of analysis whose 
study would be valid in any place, time, and legal context. In a very significant 
way, dispute processing became the foundation on which LSA was built. 
From the individual dispute, one could extend the analysis as necessary to 
every other aspect of law and culture in order to explain how conflict arose 
and was handled, whether within the formal legal system or outside it. Influ-
enced by Llewellyn and Hoebel's classic study of the "trouble case" among the 
Cheyenne,6 research on dispute processing in the 196os and 1970s fostered a 
vibrant body of theoretical and empirical literature, much of it published in 
the pages of LSR.7 This literature shaped the field, and the field shaped those 
of us who entered it. 
When I first embarked on my own scholarly career, I had no knowledge of 
LSA as an organization or the research literature associated with it. If anything, 
I fancied myself a historian of Southeast Asia with an interest in the advent of 
legal modernity in Thailand. Sheer happenstance led me to the law and 
society field. After graduating from law school, I received a fellowship to 
return to Thailand, where I had lived for three years as a Peace Corps 
volunteer. I planned to spend a postgraduate year in Chiangmai, the historic 
northern capital, to document the establishment of Thailand's European-style 
court system under King Chulalongkorn in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Before leaving for Thailand, I happened to visit my 
I 
6 Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in 
Primitive Jurisprudence (University of Oklahoma Press, 1941). 
7 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, "A comparative theory of dispute institutions in society," Law 6 
Society Review, 8(2) (1973), 217-348; Sally Falk Moore, "Law and social change: the semi-
autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study," Law 6 Society Review, 7(4) (1973), 
719-46; Marc Galanter, "Why the 'haves' come out ahead: speculations on the limits of 
legal change," Law 6 Society Review, 9(1) (1974), 95-16o; Laura Nader anQ Harry F. Todd Jr. 
(eds.), The Disputing Process- Law in Ten Societies (Columbia University Press, 1978); 
Lynn Mather and Barbara Yngvesson, "Language, audience, and the transformation of 
disputes," Law 6 Society Review, 15(3-4) (198o-1), 775-8:1.1; William L. F. Felstiner, Richard 
L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, "The emergence and transformation of disputes: naming, blaming, 
claiming ... ," Law 6 Society Review, 15(3-4) (198o-1), 631-54. 
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cousins, Robin and Jim Magavem, in Buffalo. They shared my love of Southeast 
Asia, had lived and worked there themselves, and had even slept on the floor 
of my little Peace Corps nouse in southern Thailand. Jim, a valued mentor, 
told me about a colleague at the UB law school I should meet. An hour later, 
I was sitting in the Magaverns' living room talking with a young law professor 
named Marc Galanter, and a new field opened up for me. Marc rattled off 
the names of a dozen people I should read and correspond with - people such 
as Dan Lev, Rick Abel, Bob Kidder, June Starr, Dave Trubek, and Barry 
Hooker. To my amazement, all of them answered my letters- this was before 
the age of email, of course. I quickly found myself part of the emerging law 
and society network, and there I discovered a set of theories and methods that 
helped to explain Thai law and culture much better than anything I had 
learned in law school. When I arrived back in Chiangmai and learned that the 
historical records I sought did not exist, my grounding in law and society 
research prepared me to change my project into a contemporary study of 
dispute processing centered in the local court but situated in its cultural 
and historical setting - and to combine the analysis of hundreds of case files 
with fieldwork interviews. 
By the time I began work at the American Bar Foundation, I considered 
myself as much a law and society scholar as a Thailand specialist. The transi-
tion from research based in Chiangmai to research based in Sander County 
seemed quite natural. As the LSA began to hold annual meetings on a regular 
basis, I met other like-minded colleagues with similar personal stories. In 
particular, I found myself on panels with two young anthropologists named 
Barbara Yngvesson and Carol Greenhouse. All three of us had independently 
conducted our own studies of American courts and communities. We soon 
realized we were completing one another's sentences and influencing one 
another's ideas. Later we decided to write a single book about our three 
communities, combining our insights from different regions of the country.8 
Sheer happenstance, but also the result of intellectual and institutional devel-
opments beyond our control. Free will or determinism? I'm not sure. 
As I began to write about the Sander County research, the intellectual climate 
had changed within LSAand in the related disciplines. Originally, I had thought 
my aim was to map disputes in Sander County as they emerged from the social 
milieu and traveled to different forums, in some cases all the way to the court. 
That is what the first draft of "The Oven Bird's Song" looked like. But this 
paradigm felt less and less satisfactory as time went on. In the late 1970s and early 
8 Carol J. Greenhouse, Barbara Yngvesson, and David M. Engel, Law and Community in Three 
American Towns (Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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198os, the so-called "interpretive tum" began to change the thinking of many in 
the law and society field. The writings of Clifford Geertz have become overly 
familiar to us today, and some of his most felicitous turns of phrase have become 
cliches - nowadays, who doesn't claim to do "thick description"? But in the 
1970s, Geertz had a liberating impact on law and society research and encour-
aged us to see behavior and practice as inseparable from meaning. As he wrote, 
the analysis of culture is "not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing 
social expressions on their surface enigmatical."9 
Reading Geertz and other interpretivist theorists and responding to the 
paradigm shift underway in our field, I identified myself with a group of 
LSA scholars who struggled against the constraints of the conventional · 
dispute-processing framework. I tried to ask different kinds of questions about 
the community where I had conducted my fieldwork. What was the meaning 
of the narratives offered by the longtime residents of Sander County? Why 
were they so often filled with anguish, anxiety, and loss? Why were the 
interviewees so concerned about the problem of litigiousness when law actu-
ally played such a negligible role in local injury cases? What were the words 
behind the words that the interviewees spoke? 
A later draft of the article became my job talk at SUNY Buffalo, and I kept 
working on it after I moved to Buffalo in 1981. Once again, the institutional 
context proved crucially important. I doubt that any other law school in the 
country would have hired me on the basis of that presentation! But the UB law 
school, with its unique mix of critical legal scholars and law and society 
specialists, stood for something different. It had even hired as its dean a 
sociologist, Red Schwartz, who was an LSA founder and president. By the 
time I got there, both Red and Marc Galanter had left, but a group of 
remarkable colleagues were still determined to challenge traditional legal 
and social scientific ideas. Thomas Headrick's deanship was an exciting time, 
before the long shadow of the US News and World Report rankings made legal 
academics afraid to defy convention. Settling for conventional scholarship in 
my new law-school setting almost felt like letting the team down. It was in this 
institutional climate that "The Oven Bird's Song" took its final form, in 
conversation with my new colleagues - Fred Konefsky, Jim Atleson, Jack 
Schlegel, Rob Steinfeld, Guyora Binder, Virginia Leary, and others. 
I should add that the title of the article, taken from a Robert Frost poem 
about the call of a woodland bird during a time of change and decay, was itself 
9 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973), p. 5· 
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a bit unconventional and caused some difficulty. Frost's poem depicted the 
bird' s loud and inharmonious song as a response to a post-lapsarian world, 
when springtime is long past, "the highway dust is over all," and one is left to 
ask "what to make of a diminished thing." This poem seemed an apt expres-
sion of the worldview I found in Sander County, where the denunciation of 
litigation by longtime residents became part of what I called "a ceremony of 
regret" to mourn the loss of "an untainted world that existed nowhere but in 
their imaginations." During the publication process, however, I was told to 
change the title, not just because it was unconventional, but also because 
potential readers would have no idea what the article was about. I consulted a 
number of colleagues, particularly Felice Levine, who had been a close 
colleague at the ABF and tends to have excellent judgment about this sort 
of thing. Felice thought for a moment and then advised me to keep the title. 
"This might be an article," she said, "that people wilL read ten years from now, 
and they will see the title as part of its identity." That's why it's still called 
"The Oven Bird's Song." 
CORE THEMES, PAST AND FUTURE 
It is this backward motion toward the source, 
Against the stream, that most we see ourselves in, 
The tribute of the current to the source. 
It is from this in nature we are from. 
It is most us. 
Robert Frost, 'West-Running Brook" 
After publishing "The Oven Bird's Song," I became, in Isaiah Berlin's 
terms, a hedgehog not a fox. I found myself returning again and again to the 
article's central theme: the radical disparity between "the mythology of 
· modern law"'0 and the actual tendency of ·rights holders to avoid lawyers, 
frame important issues in non-legal terms, and forgo claims when they 
suffered harm. Although law seemed to offer remedies for the problems facing 
many residents in Sander County, they viewed legal recourse in injury cases as 
a Catch 22. To make a legal claim was to identify themselves as uncultured -
as outsiders to the community in which they sought acceptance. For those at 
the margins who lacked power and were most likely to suffer injustice, this 
posed a painful dilemma. Invoking the law seemed to deny them the very 
things it purported to offer: dignity, respect, and status. 
10 See Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modem Law (Routledge, 1992). 
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Something similar was true of the men and women with disabilities whom 
Frank Munger and I interviewed in the 1990s. Many felt they had been treated 
unfairly and excluded, but they also worried that asserting their rights under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act to gain access to mainstream settings 
would simply reaffirm their identities as dependent and abnormal outsiders. 
Claiming legal rights took them through the looking glass- the faster they ran 
toward social justice, the farther they fell behind. 11 
When I returned to Thailand to explore changes in litigation and legal 
consciousness a quarter of a century after my initial research there, I expected 
to find at least modest growth in the invocation of legal rights among injury 
victims. After all, globalization is said to heighten people's awareness of the 
rule of law as a resource to redress social wrongs. Much to my surprise, 
however, I found that the central theme of "The Oven Bird's Song" - the 
avoidance of law and the positive value accorded to "lumping" - was even 
more evident than before. In Chiangmai Provincial Court I found fewer tort 
cases litigated per injury than was the case in the 1970s. Among injury victims, 
a new philosophy of karmic acceptance had replaced a centuries-old view that 
village-based wrongs demanded village-based remedies for the good of the 
entire community. Litigation now seemed selfish and anti-communitarian. 
For an injury victim to mobilize the law was to oppose fundamental cultural 
and religious values. Interviewees feared that legal claims would ultimately 
work to the disadvantage of the claimant and offer little in return. In short, 
economic development had disrupted longstanding customary law traditions, 
and "modem" legal institutions had failed to replace them io the minds of 
our interviewees.'2 
Pursuing the core themes of "The Oven Bird's Song" has thus been a 
recurring preoccupation. My latest book, The Myth of the Litigious Society: 
Why We Don't Sue,'3 returns even more explicitly to the questions that 
animated "The Oven Bird's Song" and illustrates my current perspective on 
tort law, culture, and legal consciousness in contemporary American society. 
Ample research over the past three decades has documented again and again 
that the vast majority of injury victims never make a claim of any kind against 
those who harm them. When injured, only a tiny percentage of Americans 
consult lawyers, file lawsuits, or even approach the injurers or their insurance 
11 David M. Engel and Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories 
of Americans with Disabilities (University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
" David M. Engel and Jaruwan S. Engel, Tort, Custom, and Kanna: Globalization and Legal 
Consciousness in Thailand (Stanford University Press, 2010). 
'
3 David M. Engel, The Myth of the Litigious Society: Why We Don't Sue (University of Chicago 
Press, 2016). 
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companies extrajudicially to request compensation. Lumping as default in 
injury cases has been confirmed in so many studies that its predominance 
is beyond dispute - although this fact conflicts directly with what most 
Americans believe about their own supposedly litigious society. In fact, most 
injury victims - more than 90 percent, at a conservative estimate - simply 
absorb the sometimes devastating costs and consequences of their mishaps and 
rely on their own resources, on friends and family, or on government benefits. 
But what we don't understand very well is why lumping is the predominant 
response to injuries in American society. My new book offers the results of a 
broad-ranging search for answers, not only in the law and society literature, 
but also in books and journal articles from rehabilitation science, nursing, 
anesthesiology, neuroscience, psychology, behavioral economics, anthropol-
ogy, cultural studies, and other disciplines that study injury and pain, mind 
and body, human decision-making, law, and culture. These findings can be 
summarized in four general explanations of the tendency to lump injuries. 
First, many injury victims are actively coping with trauma and pain, which 
disrupts their ability to make rational choices about the value of pursuing a 
claim as compared to lumping. Injury victims are not cool and dispassionate 
rational actors, pausing in the aisle of a grocery store to choose between two 
different brands of toothpaste. Physical injuries are exhausting and debilitat-
ing. It becomes difficult to think clearly. Injuries' effects and treatment -
including the use of powerful pain medications - can lead to social isolation 
and confusion. Furthermore, as Elaine Scarry has made clear, pain is difficult 
to communicate. 14 The person in pain feels he or she has entered a new world 
impossible to describe to others. Injuries quite literally impair the use of 
language and thus make it exceedingly difficult to voice a claim. "Physical 
pain," Scarry writes, "does not simply resist language but actively destroys it."'5 
Cognitive scientists tell us that "we think with our bodies," not just with our 
brains.'6 But what happens when the bodies with which we think are damaged 
and in agony? Pain promotes lumping because it obstructs rational decision-
making and makes it difficult to articulate and pursue a remedy. 
Second, researchers in many disciplines have discovered that people who 
suffer pain and trauma have a baffling tendency to blame themselves above all 
else. They believe that somehow they must have caused their own misfortune, 
through carelessness or through some moral failure. Pain is punishment- not 
'4 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
'
5 Ibid, 4· 
'
6 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 51. 
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just etymologically ("pain" derives from the Latin poena, meaning punishment) 
but also psychologically and even theologically. Victims are not the only ones 
who feel intuitively that injuries must be their own fault; studies show that 
outside observers have the same perception. They tend to think that if 
someone has experienced injury, disability, or disfigurement, that person must 
somehow have deserved it. It follows that blaming the victim becomes a 
reason not to blame the injurer, no matter how culpable he or she may have 
been. The claimant's supposed responsibility for the harm displaces and 
preempts the injurer's responsibility. Lumping becomes the only appropriate 
response, even if the victim is only partly at fault- and even if tort law doctrine 
would allocate some of the blame to both parties. 
Third, cultural practices and framing make many injuries appear "natural'~ 
even when they can be foreseen and easily prevented. Injuries are not object-
ive facts; they are social constructs. Our culturally conditioned perceptions of 
injuries can make them appear a normal part of life and not at all an 
appropriate occasion for bringing a claim against anyone. For example, it 
took quite a while for people to see anything wrong with cars that lacked seat 
belts and air bags, since it seemed natural for passengers in a violent collision 
to be thrown from the car or through the windshield. And it is only in the past 
few years that people have begun to view vehicles without rearview cameras as 
defective, despite the thousands of children who were killed or injured each 
year by cars backing up. As Sarah Lochlann Jain has observed, every product, 
every activity, is encoded with a certain quantum of acceptable injury.17 But 
those codes are not necessarily legible to injury victims or to others. The 
suffering of individual victims appears inevitable until a consensus develops 
that their injuries are worth avoiding by the adoption of different, safer ways of 
doing things. Moreover, the machinery of cultural production that constructs 
injuries as natural or unnatural is more accessible to the Haves than the Have-
Nots, for all the reasons Marc Galanter first explained in "Why the Haves 
Come Out Ahead.m8 Repeat players and potential tort defendants have a 
much greater capacity to persuade the public that injuries are unavoidable. 
When an injury is naturalized, lumping by the victim appears to many 
Americans to be the only sensible response, and claiming appears absurd. 
Fourth, the infrequency of claims also results from the social stigma that 
attaches to those who challenge their injurers directly. Tort litigation has 
acquired a very bad name, and tort litigants are belittled. Social stereotypes 
'
7 Sarah S. Lochlann Jain, Iniwy: The Politics of Product Design and Safety Law in the United 
States (Princeton University Press, 2oo6). 
'
8 Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead. 
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portray injury claimants and their lawyers as greedy, whining, dishonest, and 
dishonorable. Think of Saul Goodman in Breaking Bad, who keeps a box of 
neck braces in his office to help his clients exaggerate (or fabricate) their 
injuries. Think ofWalter Matthau as lawyer "Whiplash Willie" in The Fortune 
Cookie, encouraging Jack Lemmon to fake partial paralysis after a Cleveland 
Browns football player runs over him at a game. Longstanding negative images 
of tort plaintiffs and their lawyers have been magnified by a highly effective PR 
campaign waged by tort reform advocates since the 198os with ample funding 
from tobacco companies, other large corporations, and insurance companies. 
William Haltom and Michael McCann have documented how the tort 
reform campaign permeated the mass media and shaped societal understand-
ings of tort litigation.'9 Our culture is saturated with negative perceptions of 
injury victims who bring claims. These stereotypes influence potential claim-
ants as well as the family and friends who advise them. Lumping is the 
predictable result in a culture that stigmatizes people who bring claims instead 
of the people who cause them harm. 
These are the explanations for lumping that I offer in my latest book. My 
interest in the problem has roots extending back to "The Oven Bird's Song." 
Since my article was published in 1984, we have learned that Sander County 
was not a unique cultural throwback or a quaint rural exception to the general 
rule of American litigiousness. Sander County spoke more broadly to Ameri-
can culture and to our legal consciousness as a society - a point that Carol 
Greenhouse, Barbara Yngvesson, and I tried to make in our combined study of 
communities in three different parts of the country, whose residents shared an 
aversion to litigation and explained their reasons in similar words. 
Despite the obvious continuities between "The Oven Bird's Song" and my 
latest book, there are some differences that reflect changes in the field and in 
my own thinking about the problem of legal culture and consciousness. For 
example, the first explanation oflumping described above- the alienating and 
'disabling effects of trauma on potential claimants- was not apparent to me 
thirty years ago. Indeed, I taught torts and wrote about legal consciousness for 
many years without properly appreciating the significance of the fact that tort 
plaintiffs tended to be persons in physical pain. Even worse, after conducting 
research among persons with disabilities, I utterly failed to put two and two 
together and recognize that disability was a common result of tortious injuries. 
A number of the people with disabilities whom Frank Munger and 
I interviewed in the 1990s were former injury victims. Their ambivalence 
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about law was very closely connected to the ambivalence I had previously 
encountered in Sander County, although I didn't see the relationship at 
the time. 
On the other hand, the second explanation for lumping - victim-blaming 
and self-blame - was at least partially apparent to me at the time of my Sander 
County research. As described in "The OvenBird's Song," when I told one of 
the community observers about the little girl in Sander County who had been 
seriously harmed by an "attractive nuisance," he rather coldly blamed the 
child by commenting that he would "figure that the kid ought to be sharp 
enough to stay away" from the hazard.'0 And sure enough, the mother in that 
case eventually came around to the view that she herself was to blame for not 
watching her daughter closely enough. I was not prepared at that point to· 
generalize about the significance of self-blaming and victim-blaming, but in 
my new book, drawing on additional research from a variety of disciplines, 
I was ready to conclude that blaming the victim is one of the most powerful 
explanations for lumping in injury cases. 
The third explanation for lumping- the naturalization of injury- was also 
partially evident to me at the time of "The Oven Bird's Song." From my 
discussions with farming families, I learned that these stoic and admirable 
oldtimers considered injuries a part of life. Farming was hard work, and it 
involved dangerous machinery. Injuries and pain were familiar hazards, 
though risks could be reduced if one was careful (again, the importance of 
self-blame!). But it was "normal" to experience painful accidents, and what 
was "abnormal" was to view those mishaps as potential windfalls and to 
convert them into demands for compensation from someone else. As I wrote 
in "The Oven Bird's Song," "money was viewed as something one acquired 
through long hours of hard work, not by exhibiting one's misfortunes to a 
judge or jury or other third party, even when the injuries were clearly caused 
by the wrongful behavior of another."2 ' Unless injuries were perceived as an 
exception, as contrary to the natural order, they would not be viewed as an 
occasion to assert a claim. My new book presents numerous examples of the 
naturalization of injury, but the original insight is rooted in my experience in 
Sander County. 
The fourth explanation for lumping - the stigmatization of claiming in a 
culture that disvalues tort litigation - owes everything to my research in 
Sander County. The light bulb that went on as I was reading Geertz while 
struggling to write "The OvenBird's Song" was the realization that so-called 
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American litigiousness was not an objective fact but a symbolically important 
myth. This was the meaning of the song that the oven bird sang - it expressed 
nostalgia for an imagined world before the economy shifted away from 
agriculture, before "strangers" entered the community, before racial and 
ethnic diversity became visible on the main street of the town. It extolled 
lumping because claiming was a sign of cultural decline. 
Surely this deep connection between the myth of litigiousness and the 
resentment of a modern, globalized, multicultural society is even more evi-
dent today than it was thirty years ago in rural Illinois. Today, the discourse of 
social decay is everywhere. The stigmatization of tort claimants makes injury 
victims even more fearful of demanding their rights. In Sander County, the 
norms opposing tort claims created a symbolic wall to separate insiders from 
outsiders in a changing community. Today, the call for moral rectitude has 
taken on even greater urgency in the face of social changes many Americans 
find confusing and threatening. One might think that moral rectitude would 
mean·invoking the law and conforming to it, but for personal injury victims it 
means just the opposite. The morally upright person is one who abstains. He 
or she refuses to mobilize the law when injured by another. The paradox is 
compounded when we realize that people who oppose invoking the law 
against tort defendants tend to be the same people who applaud using the 
law against criminal defendants who injure others. Using the law to sanction 
injurious behavior is not in itself a signifier of moral depravity or societal 
decline; it is the use of law by the wrong people against the wrong defendants 
in the wrong kinds of cases. Those whose lives are transformed by pain and 
trauma are told to endure their misfortune and not to challenge those who 
harm them. In 2016 there is much less tort litigation in state courts and more 
lumping than there was thirty years ago, when "The Oven Bird's Song" was 
published. In this sense, America has become Sander County writ large. 
The question remains as important and complex as ever- can or should the 
law play a role when pain disrupts the relationship between self and commu-
nity? Pain isolates its victims from society, it destroys their relationships with 
others and their ability to communicate, and too often it leaves them destitute 
or with a greatly reduced capacity to earn and to thrive. And the pain of 
accidental injuries does not fall equally on the rich and the poor alike. 
Statistically speaking, risk flows down the social hierarchy and pools among 
the least privileged. Have-nots are exposed to more accidental injuries than 
the haves, yet they· are the ones least able to bear the after-effects of serious 
harm. What a terrible irony, then, that the effort to seek a legal remedy 
frequently reinforces the injury victim's identity as socially marginal, as infer-
ior, and as culturally alien. It remains an urgent task for law and society 
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scholars to understand the cultural meaning and social consequences of 
painful and damaged bodies - for individuals, for entire communities, and 
for justice. 
Research on tort law and society has advanced considerably in the past 
thirty years, but there is so much left to discover. My research growing out of 
"The Oven Bird's Song" has focused primarily on physical injuries, despite 
our growing recognition of non-physical harms to reputation, privacy, and 
emotional well-being. In my next project, I hope to remedy this shortcoming, 
but other law and society scholars are already leading the way. 22 It is always 
useful and gratifying to revisit the past, but the future of law and society 
scholarship is full of promise, as exemplified by the scholars who have 
contributed to this volume. Law and society researchers will continue to 
explore the most important sociolegal myths that prevail in our society. But, 
equally important, they will expand our theories about law and deepen our 
understanding of when and how law actually matters. What is true of tort law 
is equally true of other fields - the human side has been largely neglected in 
favor of explicating theories and rules that often have little practical relevance 
to the ind,ividuals whom law is meant to serve. If it is true that the vast 
majority of injury victims simply lump their misfortunes, if they never bring 
a claim of any kind against their injurers, then we must reconsider both the 
value and the efficacy of a great deal of tort law doctrine. Law and society 
research at its best forces us to question the obvious, to reassess prevailing 
legal practices in the light of actual behavior, and to remember that the law 
concerns real human actors, not fictional beings such as the reasonable 
person or the rational actor. 
Too seldom do we hear the real voices of injury victims. What do pain and 
trauma mean for their lives? What are their anxieties, feelings, and concerns? 
How do power relationships affect the risks they face and their responses to 
harm when it occurs? I am confident that the next generation of law and 
society scholars will continue to take full advantage of the countless opportun-
ities for research on injuries and on other pressing issues relevant to law in the 
lives of ordinary people. In the last analysis, "The Oven Bird's Song" was no 
more than a single response to this wealth of topics awaiting the attention of 
law and society researchers. It was shaped by the inspiring work of contempor-
aries and forebears and it was given meaning by the scores of imaginative 
studies that followed. It offered the portrait of a community, but it was also the 
product of a community of colleagues to whom I remain forever grateful. 
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